TO: George W. Bush

President of the United States of America

FROM: MPA Student Analyst

DATE: 21 February, 2002

RE: National Missile Defense Support

Although not a high priority in public opinion, National Missile Defense (NMD) has support in the public. In order to keep support high for any policy choice, the policy must avoid negative framing on a few issues: fear of a failed project, a possible renewed nuclear arms race, and fear of possible negative effects on foreign policy. There are three major policy choices available that also have conclusive data about support.

The issue of NMD has three different policy tiers based on which choices are considered salient. They are defined as follows:

1. Supporters – Those who believe that NMD is needed to protect U.S. foreign policy choices. Supporters do not agree on how quickly this system should be implemented. Primarily, there are two major policy points: either to deploy a system immediately or to continue research and testing before final deployment.
1. Research First - Wanting to research more on the effectiveness of the different proposed systems (boost-phase interceptors and/or mid-course interceptors, land-based platforms and/or sea-based platforms) before the final implementation.
2. Rapid Development - Wanting the immediate implementation of the current land-base, mid-course interceptor platform followed by research of other platforms.
2. Opponents - Those who believe that NMD will impede nuclear disarmament, break necessary treaties, create an arms race, and a coalition between China and Russia. This group also believes that it will increase the exportation of dangerous technologies out of China and Russia to pay for the expensive nuclear weapons needed to feel secure against a NMD system.

Public opinion fluctuates in reaction to the arguments of the different sides of the issue. When asked, without given more information than they have already gained, whether they support a NMD system or not, the majority polled support it (from 71% to 56% depending on the wording and the polling style). Fluctuations begin when the same group is given information about the various arguments presented by opponents to NMD:

1. When told about the current and proposed future cost of the project, support is sustained at just above 50%.
2. If given information about the possibility that the project, as it stands now, would fail, support plummets to below 25%.
3. Also, if made aware of the possible effects on foreign policy and nuclear arms race, support plummets to below 25% again.

We can conclude that a NMD policy that takes the second and third points out of concern would receive the most support.

The results suggest that the three major issue tiers have different levels of support, based on their ability to be framed positively by avoiding fears of failure, negative foreign policy effects, and a renewed nuclear arms race. Of these three, more research would receive the most support because it would avoid fears of failure by doing enough research to garner support from the scientific community. It would delay foreign policy issues that decrease support, which could be alleviated by further diplomacy on this issue.

The rapid development option would receive very little support. My research concludes that the there would be high initial support for a rapidly developed NMD, but once this issue was framed in a public debate, the support would turn to opposition swiftly. Currently, the scientific community disputes the ability for any system to work. This group, once they received a public voice, would increase opposition to this option. Foreign policy pundits would use the effects of this system on our relationship with Russia and China to decrease support for this NMD option; specifically, the creation of another nuclear arms race, and the construction of a strategic partnership between China and Russia would be enough to deplete any initial support for this plan.

Not creating an NMD would garner as little, if not less, support than the Rapid Development option. Fear of a nuclear war, accidental launch, the spread of the nuclear arsenal to non-Western countries, or a terrorist threat outweigh the cost on foreign policy, the possibility of a failed project, or the high price tag. Now that the issue is on the agenda, it would be difficult to ignore.

The evidence shows how fluctuating the support of each policy can be given the amount of information the public is given. Whichever policy option chosen, the major obstacles towards garnering the most support are losing your ability to control the way the issue is framed, not testing the fluctuating opinion of the public, and bringing excessive attention to your issue (right now NMD is not the highest priority which can be an advantage to any policy chosen).