

Appendix I: Measurement of Variables

-Group Identity and Mobilizational Resources-

Regional Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDP)

GDP represents the regional GDP per capita measured as a proportion of the overall Spanish average of 100, adjusted annually. The regional GDP scores (along with the updated Spanish average of 100) were available for each of the 17 regions for 1973, 1985, 1989, 1991, and 1993. Missing years between 1977 and 1996 were given scores via interpolation and extrapolation. Values range from a low of 61.43 for Extremadura in 1977 to a high of 151.85 for the Balearic Islands in 1996 (mean = 99.91, std. dev. = 21.21) [Sources: Rodríguez, 1989; Heywood, 1995]

Cohesiveness of Group Identity (COHESION)

Average percentage of ethno-regional community members that responded favorably to the question 'Is your autonomous community a distinct "nation"?' in surveys conducted in 1990, 1992, and 1996. The variable is a constant over time for each group. Values range from 1 for Murcia and La Rioja to 37.33 for Catalonia (mean = 9.91, std. dev. = 10.44) [Source: Moral, 1998]

- Grievances -

Subjective Level of Grievances (GRIEVANCE)

Percentage of ethnonational community members that responded in favor of independence or federalist options in surveys conducted in 1976, 1979, 1980 and 1990. Values for missing years determined via interpolation and extrapolation. Values range from 2 for Extremadura in 1980 to 47.2 for Catalonia in 1990 (mean = 13.94, std. dev. = 10.08) [Sources: Ferrando, 1980; Ferrando et al., 1994]

- Mobilization -

Militant and Open Mobilization (OPENMOB & MILMOB)

The indicators used are analogous to those developed for the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project. MAR coders were then instructed to look for (wherever applicable) the three largest militant and three largest open organizations in each ethnonational community and assign each organization a score from 0 - 3 depending on its level of popular support. Values for the three open organizations, as for the three militant organizations, were then summed to create scores for *openmob* and *milmob*, respectively. While the measure is prima facie valid, the MAR team admits that the reliability of the measure of popular support is not fully satisfactory (Gurr, Marshall & Davenport, 2002). In response, I have enhanced the sophistication of the coding procedure by utilizing voting patterns as a gauge of popular support. Such a strategy has a high degree of utility in democratic countries, where contentious organizations can operate openly as political parties. This makes it relatively straightforward to determine both the number of and votes for nationalist organizations.

First, voting data were gathered for all regional and national elections in the post-Franco era. Regional elections were held in 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995 in all autonomous communities except Galicia, Andalusia, Catalonia and the Basque Country, which individually set the timing for their own elections. This was the primary source of vote data for the open and militant mobilization variables. To increase the accuracy of the early scores, vote data from the national elections of 1977 and 1979 were also used. For years in between elections, the values were interpolated. Electoral and political party data derived from *El País: Anuario*, editions 1982 – 1996. Organizational data derived from numerous sources.

Openmob is measured here by multiplying the number of open organizations operative in each region by the total percentage of the vote (0-100) for nationalist political parties in regional elections. The end result is a measure of mobilization with greater reliability and sophistication than anything possible in a large-scale, cross-national project such as MAR. Scores range from 0 in Murcia (all years) to 470.47 for the

Basque Country in 1990 (mean = 66.45, std. dev. = 111.52). The end result is a measure of mobilization with greater reliability and sophistication than anything possible in a large-scale, cross-national project such as MAR.

Though it is not possible to measure militant mobilization with the same degree of sophistication, a similarly reliable technique can be employed. In Spain, numerous legal political parties on the far left have advocated revolutionary means of change; often, these parties have been associated with actively militant, illegal political organizations. For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, or Catalan Republican Left) and Bloc Esquerra d'Acció Nacionalista (BEAN, or Leftist Nationalist Action Bloc) in Valencia and Catalonia; Herri Batasuna (HB, or Popular Unity) and Euskadi Ezkerra (EE, or Basque Left) in Navarre and the Basque Country; and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG, or Galician Nationalist Bloc) in Galicia all advocated violent means to their political ends. During that time, two of these were associated with active terrorist organizations—HB with the 'military' wing of ETA (ETA-m, or Basque Homeland and Liberty—military), and EE with the slightly less radical 'political-military' wing of ETA (ETA-pm). Shortly thereafter, in 1983, ETA-pm put down its arms and EE, following suit, ceased to support violent means. Accordingly, a vote for EE before 1983, and a vote for HB up to 1996, can safely be considered a vote of support for the militant organizations for which EE and HB were the political arms. At the same time, a vote for the ERC in Catalonia from 1977 – 1990 could be considered tacit support for violence in Catalonia, even though no terrorist organization actually existed until *Terra Lliure* (Free Land) became active in 1980.

Following MAR coding procedures (Gurr, Marshall & Davenport, 2002), *milmob* was operationalized by measuring annually the number of active militant organizations in each region and the extent of popular support for each organization as evinced in the percentage of the vote given to its 'political wing' in regional elections. I used the same scale as MAR coders, where a value of '1' was assigned to each organization with support of less than 10% of the community in regional elections and a '2' for those organizations with support of between 10% and 20% of the population (there were no scores of '3', since no individual organization had support of greater than 20% of the population). These organization values were then summed by region to create annual militant mobilization scores. As in MAR, values range from 0 to 3 (mean = 0.39, std. dev. = 0.78).

- Political Opportunity Structures -

Regime Type

This indicator measures the relative openness of political competition. Calculated annually from 1977 – 1996 by using Polity's well established *democracy – autocracy* index. Spain's score ranges from 5 in 1977 to 10 in 1996 (mean = 9.77, std. dev. = 0.49). [Source: Polity IV Project, 2000]

Regime Change

Regime change is a measure of the extent of regime change from one year to the next. This variable is derived from the *Regime type* variable using the following formula:

$$\text{REGIME CHANGE} = \text{Regime Type}[t] - \text{Regime Type}[t-1]$$

Possible range of values is from –20 to +20; Spain's range is from 0 to 4 (mean = 0.27, std. dev. = 0.93).¹

Major Democratic Transition

Dummy variable with a value of '1' for years Spain was undergoing a major regime opening. In the Polity projects, a jump in a state's *polity* score (*democracy-autocracy*) of six or more points in a three-year period or less is considered a 'major democratic transition' (Polity IV Project, 2000). Spain's *polity* score increased by a total of 16 points from 1975 to 1978. Accordingly, the variable has a value of '1' in this data set for 1977 and 1978 (mean = 0.06, std. dev. = 0.23). [Source: Polity IV Project, 2000]

Democratic Durability

Number of years since transition to democracy (*durable* in the Polity IV data set).² By the end of 1978, Spain had achieved a high level of democracy. Accordingly, 1979 is the first year for which *durability* > 0 (mean = 8.97, std. dev. = 5.50, min. value = 0, max. value = 18). [Source: Polity IV Project, 2000]

Involvement of Nationalist Parties in Autonomous Regional Governments (NATIONALIST GOVT)

This variable combines a measure of regional autonomy with data on the party composition of the 17 regional governments. *Nationalist govt* is a dummy variable with values of '1' assigned to those communities for years in which its regional government was run either exclusively or in a coalition by a nationalist political party (mean = 0.25, std. dev. = 0.43). The first regional parliaments commence in 1980 in Catalonia and the Basque Country, 1981 in Galicia, 1982 in Andalusia, and 1983 in the other 13 regions. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, the value is '1' for all years from 1980 to 1996. About half of the regions never receive such a score. For others, a nationalist party rules in a coalition government for only a few years during the time period under consideration (e.g., 1995 and 1996 in the case of Valencia). [Source: El País: Anuario, editions 1982 – 1996]

Political Repression (REPRESSION)

The method for operationalizing this variable is taken from Beissinger (1996), and is analogous to measures used in Davenport (1995, 1996), Francisco (1995), Beissinger (2002), and della Porta & Reiter (1998). First, all instances of arrests, injuries, or deaths during protest activities are summed for each region for each year. This figure is then divided by the total number of protests in the region each year. The range of values for *repression* is from 0 (for Extremadura in 1980, *inter alia*) to 17.0 for Navarre for 1987 (mean = 0.31, std. dev. = 1.36). [Source: annual indices to *El País*, 1977 – 1996]

- Dependent Variables: Protest & Rebellion -

Contention (PROTEST and REBELLION)

Annual event count³ of protest and rebellious activities for each of the 17 autonomous communities (for *protest*, mean = 5.81, std. dev. = 14.29, min. = 0, max. = 102; for *rebellion*, mean = 6.43, std. dev. = 22.33, min. = 0, max. = 144). The rules for coding an event as 'protest' or 'rebellion' were analogous to those given to MAR coders.⁴ All intentionally violent contentious actions are coded as rebellion. All activities without this intention are coded as protest events. Riots and other spontaneous outbursts of violence are thus considered to be protest behavior. [Source: annual indices to *El País*, 1977 – 1996]

Notes

¹ Spain is a good example of an autocratic state that underwent a ‘large’ or ‘major’ transition to a full democracy between 1975 and 1978; in this period its *polity* score increased 16 points (to +9 in 1978) over its 1974 score of -7.

² To capture time elapsed since change, Hegre et al. (2001) use a ‘proximity’ variable (an exponential measure with decreasing values over time) instead of Polity IV’s steadily increasing ‘regime durability’ variable. Conceptually, the two are similar. The proximity variable makes more sense when covering a very long period of time, as in their study. When there is less than a generation of democratic consolidation (see Saideman et al., 2002, for a discussion), as with Spain in the present test, the two variables produce substantively similar results. Saideman et al. (2002) use a re-coded version of the durability variable.

³ This annual aggregation is in line with previous studies (Gupta, Singh & Sprague, 1993; Davenport, 1995, 1996; Ekiert & Kubik, 1998; Krain, 1998).

⁴ Because of the lack of consistently available information for all 275 cases, the MAR project creates ordinal scales for rebellion and protest for each ethnopolitical group based on the single largest protest or rebellion event that takes place in each region every year. To create analogous scales out of the non-sampled event data available for Spain would result in an unnecessary loss of information. Because all violent events will tend to be reported in the national press, while only larger non-violent events will tend to be thus reported, this non-sampled data set contains more instances of rebellion than of protest. Consequently, this study should not be viewed as facilitating the study of *small* non-violent contentious events. Rather, it is a study of essentially all violent events and medium-to-large non-violent events. This is a further reason for why it is favorable to test protest and rebellion separately.

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